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Economic deregulation of local bus services remains controversial in terms of 
the claimed gains and losses relative to competitive regulation in the form of competi-
tive tendering or negotiated protected monopoly. The uncertainty over demonstrable 
net benefits has delayed, if not eliminated, any prospects for unleashing market forces 
in London where competitive tendering is claimed by its supporters to be at least as 
attractive as economic deregulation in terms of quantity and quality of service. While 
the literature has focused predominantly on the economic and social impacts of mar-
ket reforms, some of the changes have brought about environmental gains and losses. 
These rarely have been documented, being overshadowed by the initial objectives 
motivating economic reform. One particular feature of economic deregulation in the 
United Kingdom (and to a lesser extent in Australia and New Zealand) has been the 
noticeable increase in minibus services. The impact that economic deregulation has 
on entrepreneurial innovation has been neglected in the public transport literature, 
yet it is a centerpiece of competitive strategy. We use the experience with minibuses in 
Britain to show how markets create environmentally compatible incentives. Environ-
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mental gains attributable to market reform counter in part the negative evidence that 
minibuses in Britain have ''failed" to stimulate an aggregate increase in ridership. 
Without knowing the counterfactuals, one might speculate that the outcome would 
have been even worse without the introduction of the minibus. 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom experience of bus deregulation and privatization has 
been taken as perhaps the most important example of the role of using market 
forces to meet government objectives in transport. Economic deregulation in 
1985 was designed to remove the binding constraint on competitive bus entry, 
leaving the latent barriers to entry to be revealed. The academic debate has been 
extensive (see Mackie and Preston 1996; Mackie et al. 1995; Beesley and Glaister 
1985; Gwilliam et al. 1985). It has tended to be polarized as a confrontation of 
two views: either to let market forces decide what should be provided in terms of 
bus outputs and qualities, or retain government definitions of what should be 
produced, while using market processes to provide the means via competitive 
tendering. It is a common belief that either leads to substantial cost savings; the 
disagreement is about the resulting level and quality of outputs. 
One important argument in the political debate that has assumed much greater 
practical importance in the last I 0 years-namely, environmental objectives-
has been neglected in the exchanges on bus policy. Specifically, it is unclear 
what influence the changes have had on emissions, which are seen of great envi-
ronmental significance. We offer a preliminary view, concentrating in particular 
on the impact of the minibus "revolution" on greenhouse gas emissions and 
using the counterfactual of a similar aggregate bus sector output. 
The impact that economic deregulation has on entrepreneurial innovation 
has been neglected in the public transport literature, yet it is a centerpiece of 
competitive strategy. Seeking out entrepreneurial activity is an attractive way of 
shifting political agendas, at least in the countries with which we are most famil-
iar, the U.K. and Australia; yet it has not been fully exploited by the privatization 
process, which emphasizes almost exclusively the reduction in the burden of 
government debt. 
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A great attraction of the outcome of minibus provision is that it is politi-
cally'plausible, since the means employed to realize policy objectives are them-
selves credible-by reducing subsidy and improving customer service. Such in-
novation consistent with incentives, driven largely by market conditions, are 
fundamental to long-run profit and, hence, have appeal to entrepreneurial bus 
operators. 
We use the experience with minibuses in Britain to show how markets cre-
ate environmentally compatible incentives. Environmental gains attributable to 
market reform counter, in part, the negative evidence that minibuses in Britain 
have "failed" to stimulate an aggregate increase in ridership. Without knowing 
the true counterf actuals, one might speculate that the outcome would have been 
even worse without the introduction of the minibus. 
Market Forces as Natural Generators of Innovative Activity 
The view that government must intervene in an overt way for negative envi-
ronmental impacts to be minimized is as alive today as it was 30 years ago when, 
in July 1966, the U.K. Minister of Transport presented to Parliament the white 
paper titled "Transport Policy" (HMSO 1966). The first paragraph stated that: 
. . . The rapid development and mass production of the motor 
vehicle over the past 20 years has brought immense benefits to 
millions of people: increased mobility, a fuller social life, family 
enjoyment, new experiences ..... But at the same time it has 
brought severe discomforts: congestion in the streets of our towns; 
the misery of the journey to work for commuters; noise, fumes 
and danger as the setting of our lives; a rising trend of casualties 
on our roads and a threat to our environment in both town and 
countryside which if it continues unchecked, will ensure that the 
pleasure and benefit for which we use the car will increasingly 
elude us. The aim of a rational transport policy must be to solve 
this paradox. 
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The policy statement went on to state: 
. . . Our towns and cities will never be able to cope with their 
traffic, or the transport needs of millions of people, without 
strengthening, improving and expanding their public transport 
services .... Clearly these services must adapt themselves to new 
technological developments, but to get more people . . . moved 
with less road space is vital to the solution of our transport prob-
lems .... New thinking is required, not only about types and 
combinations of public transport, but also about how they should 
be financed. To attempt to solve these problems in exclusively 
commercial terms is to bring the Victorian mentality to the solu-
tion of modem needs. 
An implication of this white paper is that government, through planning 
processes, has a greater chance of providing the necessary incentives to secure 
improved public transport as an antidote to the automobile, in contrast to the 
market. This duly underpinned the government's attitude toward public trans-
port, and its willingness to subsidize to do so, whatever party was in power, up to 
the early 1980s. The position promoted in this paper is that the information re-
quired by government to plan can only be generated efficiently if markets are 
allowed to function. Deregulation in Britain since 1985 provides the best empiri-
cal setting for evaluating the innovations that have been initiated by the power of 
the market (even if the benefits have spilled over into all supply regimes) (Gomez-
lbafiez and Meyer 1997). 
While it is true that, to date, demonstration of gains to bus business from 
environmental innovativeness, in particular, is not widespread, there is very en-
couraging evidence emerging (see below) that market forces create opportuni-
ties for innovative activity, which is not only supportive of profits but has desir-
able environmental outcomes. Through the example of minibuses-a product of 
market driven incentives-we show that government, prior to the 1985 Act, may 
have restricted the opportunities to improve public transport in contrast to acting 
as if they were embellishing opportunities for better public transport. 
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The question not addressed in the literature on bus provision is the extent to 
which innovative opportunities are greater under regimes that lessen the power 
of the regulator in delivery of services. It may be the case that the empirical 
evidence, as limited as it is, is misleading because of the failure of incentive 
structures to deliver the gains that are inherent in a less constrained market. 
What we need to understand are the circumstances under which incentives can 
evolve and be effective. One problem with the bus industry may be that the lack 
of experience in managing change and/or the reticence in being innovative, given 
a history of suppression of innovation, is hampering the speed of taking up op-
portunities waiting for action. Generational inheritance, for example, which of-
ten lacks an understanding of the need to sustain wealth and survival, leads to a 
reduction in entrepreneurial activity and, hence, a decline in any potential inno-
vation. Why has the minibus and hail-n-ride only been introduced in the era of 
deregulation/competitive regulation and potential competition in the U.K., New 
Zealand, and Australia? As Porter and van der Linde ( 1995) comment in the 
context of environmental innovativeness spurred by competition: 
We are currently in a transitional phase of industrial history where 
companies are still inexperienced in dealing creatively with envi-
ronmental issues. 
The literature that looks at the broader set of potential benefits concen-
trates on direct benefits to users (e.g., Nash 1988; Ellis et al. 1996; Evans 1990; 
Mackie et al. 1995) showing variability in gains and losses to users. A strong 
case has also been mounted against supply opportunities that do not preserve the 
regulator's control on demand-coordinating mechanisms such as timetables and 
ticketing (see also Tyson 1995). Indeed, Evans' ( 1990) argument for natural mo-
nopoly in the supply oflocal schedule route services is predicated entirely on the 
role of economies of network interdependencies so as to minimize uncertainty 
and waiting time, etc., in transfers. 
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The Minibus and the Environment 
Urban passenger transport demand is multi-dimensional. It encompasses 
the location of activities, the alternative travel opportunities available, and the 
availability of types of motorized and non-motorized transport. A potential user 
of the transport system faces choice opportunities with varying degrees of avail-
ability. In the long run, individuals have increasing opportunities to review all 
key transport-related choices-where to live, where to work, the number and 
types of automobiles in the household, the choice of means of transport and time 
of departure for the journey to work, and even negotiation of the temporal and 
spatial nature of working hours (i.e., flextime, a compressed work week and 
telecommuting). In the short run, some of these choices are not available and, 
hence, condition the choices that can be evaluated and changed. 
Using a model system of the household sector developed for Perth, West 
Australia (Hensher 1996), we have evaluated their impact over the period 1993-
2003. The model system is an integrated land-use and transport system incorpo-
rating linked models for household location decisions, vehicle choice decisions 
and travel decisions (timing, mode choice, workplace location choice). 
The behavioral models in the simulator are presented in sub-modules repre-
senting the four natural divisions of: 
(I) commuter choice: spatial and temporal choice of working hours, de-
partur~ time choice, mode choice, and workplace location choice; 
(2) automobile choice: vehicle type choice and household fleet size choice; 
(3) residential choice: location and dwelling type choice; and 
( 4) automobile use: total annual vehicle and household kilometers and the 
spatial composition of kilometers. 
The decision blocks for location decisions, vehicle decisions, and travel 
decisions and their major linkages are summarized in Figure I. Each of the blocks 
has a set of internal linkages; the blocks are themselves linked by a set of exter-
nal linkages. The inclusive value (IV) indices provide behavioral linkages be-
tween discrete choices that are globally consistent with utility maximization; the 
selectivity correction (SC) indices provide equivalent linkages between a dis-
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crete choice (e.g., vehicle type) and a continuous choice (e.g., vehicle kilome-
ters). Three instruments (land rents, used vehicle prices, and commuting travel 
times) are used to equilibrate within three of the decision blocks, with the option 
to bypass vehicle market equilibration. The non-commuting car use decision 
block does not have a market clearing facility in the current specification. 
There is an assumed decision hierarchy in which residential location is the 
uppermost decision of a household, and, as we move down the decision tree, we 
condition each of the worker-related choices on the higher order decisions. The 
choice of workplace location for each worker in a household is conditional on 
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the household's choice of residential location. Likewise, the choice of commuter 
mode is conditional on the choice of residential and workplace location. The 
presence of more than one worker in a household is allowed for by having a 
separate choice for each worker, together with additional exogenous variables to 
account for the influence of the number of workers on each worker's choice of 
mode, workplace, and household residential location. The modal opportunities 
include the set of available alternatives and possible future investments in "new" 
modes in specific spatial contexts, such as light rail and bus priority systems. 
Stated choice experiments are combined with revealed preference data in the 
estimation of the departure time choice and commuter mode choice models. Full 
details of the simulator are presented in Hensher (1996) and Hensher et al. ( 1995). 
To understand how we identify the impact of a policy instrument, consider 
an increase in service frequency. The imposition of this improved service via its 
impact on the generalized cost of using buses has an immediate and direct influ-
ence on (I) the use of each competing means of transport for particular trips 
such as the commuter trip, (2) a possible change in the timing of the particular 
journey, which creates a further change in the generalized costs associated with 
traffic congestion, and, hence, (3) a possible change in the overall and non-com-
muting use of each automobile available to a household. It may directly affect 
the household's choice of types of automobiles. The indirect impacts may, in the 
longer term, include a change in residential location via the change in modal and 
spatial accessibility to work opportunities, and a change in the number of ve-
hicles in a household (given the reduced demand for auto use). Changes in resi-
dential location may further affect the total use of each automobile, as well as the 
mix of urban (commuting and non-commuting) and non-urban kilometers. The 
adjustment in commuter travel may also affect non-commuting car use. 
The adjustments in vehicle, travel, and location choices at the household 
level translate at the aggregate level into a new set of equilibrium levels for 
traffic congestion (broadly measured by the ratio of travel time to distance trav-
eled), residential densities, total kilometers of travel by automobiles and various 
forms of public transport, fuel consumed, and greenhouse gas emissions. Table 1 
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summarizes the 
results of emis-
sion changes 
(and other inter-
esting statistics) 
in bus frequency 
with the intro-
duction of mini-
buses in which 
we replace all 
large buses with 
minibuses. This 
substitutes better 
fuel consump-
tion (in liters per 
100 kms) and 
Table 1 
The Impact of Minibus Substitution in 
Perth, West Australia, 1993-2003 
Mbrihus Substitution 
Outputs Bus Frequency 
10% 10% 10% 
Change in: iii crease increase decrease 
co2 (mean% pa) -0.16 -0.34 0.18 
End user cost ($mpa) -3.0 -4.8 3.1 
Car vkm (meano/opa) -0.23 -0.51 0.20 
Auto energy (meano/opa) -0.24 -0.56 0.22 
Govt auto rev (%pa) -0.21 -0.47 0.20 
Car commuting share (%) -1.0 -1.8 0.85 
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changes the frequency of service. All changes commence in 1996. The cost items 
are calculated in constant dollars ($93), but are converted into present values at 
a real discount rate of 8 percent per annum over 10 years for all dollar-based 
items. Minibuses average 15-20 liters per 100 kms in U.K. in the late 1980s 
(White 1988), and 16-18 liters/I OOkm in Sydney, Australia in 1997 (Westbus 
Nepean Nippers), compared to a large bus of 38-42 liters per I OOkms. 
The change in C02 with increased frequency is the net effect of: 
( 1) changes in vehicle fuel efficiency (liters/ I OOkm) due to switching large 
buses for small buses, 
(2) changes in aggregate vehicle kilometers provided by buses with in-
creased frequency, 
(3) modal switching from car to the improved bus service, and 
( 4) possible changes in household automobile fleet size and composition 
and the location of work and residential activity. 
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Changes in bus kilometers and car kilometers are highly correlated with 
changes in emissions of C02• 
Although small as a percentage change, minibuses accompanied by increased 
service frequency decrease carbon dioxide emissions. The majority of the change 
in C02 is attributable to items (1), (2), and (3) above. In particular, gains in fuel 
efficiency and increased bus modal share reduce CO 2 by 1. 7 percent, while in-
creases in bus vehicle kilometers increases C02 by 1.55 percent. The impact of 
relocation of work and residential activity was negligible in the current applica-
tion (net impact of -0.01 percent in C02), but recognition of the potential for 
relocation of activities is important in assessing the net impact of policy instru-
ments. 
The increase in service frequency (often linked to the introduction of mini-
buses) has a noticeable impact on total end user costs (money and time costs), 
reducing them by up to $4.8m per annum for all travel for a 20 percent improve-
ment in frequency compared to headways offered by large buses under current 
timetables. The impact on energy consumed, automobile kilometers, and rev-
enue to government from automobile use is small, less than I percent. 
The simulations undertaken are an improvement over the very aggregate 
partial analysis of the impact of minibuses undertaken by Banister and Banister 
( 1995), which concludes that a minibus is 27 percent less fuel efficient on a per 
passenger basis than a large bus, and the study by White and Turner, which esti-
mates, on balance, due to a partial shift to minibuses in Britain, less than 2 
percent saving in fuel costs per bus kilometer (White and Turner 1990). Envi-
ronmental gains attributable to market reform counter, in part, the negative evi-
dence that minibuses in Britain have "failed" to stimulate an aggregate increase 
in ridership. Without knowing the counterfactuals, one might speculate that the 
outcome would have been even worse without the introduction of the minibus. 
Fuel Excise and the Environment 
Another policy instrument with positive environmental outcomes is a fuel 
excise applied to all modes. The impact of reduced greenhouse gas emission is 
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substantial, as might be ex-
pected (Table 2). The net 
changes in co2 associated 
with a fuel excise tax are 
predominantly due to 
changes in vehicle use (and 
the mix of vehicle types in 
the car park), with very little 
associated with substitution 
between cars and large 
buses under existing time-
tables. Clearly, a general 
policy instrument applied to 
all modes, especially the 
automobile, will have a 
greater impact on the envi-
Table 2 
The Impact of Fuel Excise in 
Perth, West Australia, 1993-2003 
Fuel Excise on 
Outputs on Cars and Buses 
Change in: 60c/I 80c/l 
C02 (mean % pa) -9.0 -17.4 
End user cost ($mpa) 68.9 125 
Car vkm ( mean%pa) -9.07 -17.4 
Auto energy ( mean%pa) -8.80 -17.3 
Govt auto rev (%pa) 18.3 32.4 
Car commuting share (%) -0.61 -1.23 
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ronment than a policy applied to a public transport mode; and thus, in evaluating 
the change in innovation attributed to the minibus, we will never be able to estab-
lish a level of environmental benefit that can match any level achievable with 
even a relatively modest fuel excise. Importantly however the real difference 
between the two policy instruments is that people are revealed to prefer mini-
buses and dislike taxes. 
As an environmentally attractive policy instrument, sizeable fuel excise in-
creases achieve more impact than does adjustments in levels of frequency of 
buses. Although improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency reduce total end user 
cost substantially, the impact on energy and C02 is significantly less than a fuel 
excise. However, in terms of the political cost of policy changes, the payoff to 
minibuses is highly likely to be superior; changes in tax levels associated with 
minibus deregulation are negligible. 
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Deregulation and Innovation in Bus Operations: 
Extracting Some Counterfactuals 
To throw some light on the issue of innovations accompanying deregula-
tion, to complement the simulation undertaken in the previous section, we un-
dertook a survey of a number of route services operators in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom who are operating under a deregulated regime. Information 
was also sought from some Sydney (Australia) operators who provide services 
under an area contract subject to minimum service levels and maximum fares 
(see Brewer and Hensher 1997). The responses are reproduced in Appendix A. 
Counterfactual knowledge of the situation under regulation is not available. All 
that we have to rely on is the evidence offered by operators in the deregulated 
market. The findings suggest that there have been noticeable beneficial changes 
in vehicle kilometers delivered and patronage as well as innovative examples, 
especially under economic deregulation. Innovations attributed to the deregu-
lated environment are the introduction of minibuses, increased service frequency, 
marketing by segments, more fuel efficient buses, and more flexible route de-
sign. 
What we find not only supports the position that relaxing constraints on the 
market's operations has a direct innovative effect on operators now in deregu-
lated markets, but it appears to create spillover effects into restricted markets 
who see the benefits of such innovative activity. A good example is minibuses 
increasingly used on competitively-tendered routes as well as on operations, where 
the incumbent remains protected by anti-competitive area franchises, as is the 
case in the main throughout Australia. 
Concern for the environment means a shift toward a larger number of modal 
opportunities for transport users as well as a recognition that environmental ben-
efits may arise from many behavioral responses such as the endogenous set of 
location, vehicle, and travel choices operating in the travel simulator applied to 
Perth. This leads to less reliance on mode outputs as proxies for the greater good 
and increasing input or reliance on market driven means. This is consistent with 
a shift towards more indirect instruments of policy, such as indirect taxes and 
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competitive rules, rather than protection or enhancement of particular transport 
modes. 
Furthermore, allowing markets to generate fresh opportunities for profit 
making is a means to encourage relevant charitable activities. Successful busi-
ness people are able to pursue their own enthusiasms because of that profit. 
Indeed, the outstanding innovations have arisen in this way. Perhaps most no-
table in the U.K. were the pioneering efforts in housing and planning by the 
chocolate and soap entrepreneurs, Cadbury, Rowntree, and Lever. Nowadays, 
environmental innovation should be no exception, and successful transport op-
erators are seen as a fertile ground. In the research for this paper, for example, 
we found minibus operators to be unaware of the possible connection between 
their operation and pollution reduction. Once it is pointed out via the indirect 
effects we have described, interest is stimulated by the perception that here is 
another reason for minibus operations to be preferred by policymakers and is a 
case of promoting the public interest while making a profit. It is then quite con-
ceivable that their interest will broaden into trade-offs that create more benefits 
even where this involves some increases in their outgoings-for example, on an 
excise tax imposed on all vehicles of a given engine capacity. 
Concluding Thoughts 
If it can be shown that there are political credits from innovations in the bus 
sector that are supportive of broad-based environmental objectives of govern-
ment, then this gets political attention. It also raises the limitation of the promo-
tion of better cost-benefit analysis in a political sense-at the margin, CBA en-
hancements cannot be traded since other politically-competing sectors fail dis-
mally in producing such sophistication in technique to evaluate projects. 
The empirical evidence that economic deregulation in the U.K. has pro-
duced sizeable increases in vehicle kilometers but no noticeable increase in pas-
senger kilometers might, in a partial equilibrium setting, lead to the conclusion 
that the minibus has contributed to the aggregate reduction in passenger kilome-
ters. What is missing in this inference is the counterfactual that may show an 
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even worse diminution in passenger kilometers in the absence of the minibus 
"revolution." What we can suggest, however, is that the minibus has brought 
with it, on our evidence, small but noticeable environmental benefits (which 
may be even greater with the counterfactuals as the base). 
If the unchanged quantity of patronage is now traveling on more environ-
mentally-friendly bus systems in contrast to the pre-deregulated era, then the 
systemwide environmental benefits are positive. In particular, less greenhouse 
gas emissions are being generated in the delivery of an economic deregulated 
service. The example for greenhouse gas emissions should be extended to in-
clude other environmental impacts such as air quality, noise, and safety. •!• 
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Appendix A 
Innovative Opportunities and Key Changes in Operations 
for "Better-Practice" Operators 
Specific notable changes: 
Monopoly Operations 
(threat of tendering only) 
(I) Enhanced cross-regional services, improved off-peak services and in-
troduced "set-down" on request. 
Overall change in kilometers: 
(I) Over period 92/93-95/96 increased by 12%. 
Overall change in passengers: 
(1) Over period 92/93-95/96 increased by 3%. 
Overall change in fare levels: 
(1) Over period 92/93-95/96, increased by 2% pa. 
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Change in corporate strategy: 
(1) None. 
New opportunities under tendering: 
(1) Nil. 
Actions to reduce environmental impacts: 
97 
(1) CNG buses, Euro II engines, disability trials, all depot facilities con-
form to environmental standards, working with clean Air 2000 initia-
tive in Australia. 
Deregulated Market 
Specific notable changes: 
(I) Large buses phased out, mini/midi buses introduced with increased 
frequency, urban mileage increased, interurban mileage increased, 
greater penetration of housing estates, "hail-n-ride," rural mileage de-
creased. 
(2) Higher frequency, minibuses and cross-town services. 
(3) Concentrate marketing/product on high frequency key services. 
Overall change in kilometers: 
(I) Average of I 0% pa increase. 
(2) 8% pa increase. 
(3) Increase by 5% pa. 
Overall change in passengers: 
( 1) Average increase of 8.6% over 3 years compared to average national 
decline of 5%. 
(2) 20% pa increase. 
(3) Increase by 15% over 3 years. 
Overall change in fare levels: 
( 1) 20% increase over 6 years compared to CPI increase of 30%. 
(2) No real fare change. 
(3) Remained static. 
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Change in corporate strategy: 
( 1) No cross-subsidization between routes or times of day or week, no fare 
scales-market pricing route by route, never knowingly undersold by 
the competition. 
(2) Emphasis on cost reduction, improved customer service and improved 
relationships with regulatory authority and wider community. 
(3) Much more innovative and immediate in response. 
New opportunities under deregulation: 
( 1) Market segmentation-high quality and low grade services on same 
route, experimented more with routes-frequencies, fares, special pro-
motion; let the customer decide rather than ~ Local Authority 
(2) Reduce costs and increased customer service delivery. 
(3) Improve frequencies, bold expts with fares. 
Actions to reduce environmental impacts: 
(1) Using low sulphur diesel, choose Eurol or Euro2 specifications of 
vehicles, experimenting with gas vehicles. 
(2) Refurbished trolley buses, extended use of trolley buses, introduced 
Euro I compatible diesel buses-now 30% of fleet, increased market 
share relatively to less environmentally friendly modes. 
(3) Emission controls through Euro I and II engines. 
Competitive Tendering/Contracts 
Specific notable changes: 
( 1) Better route structures-changed 80% of what we inherited; headways 
no more than 30 mins, better trained drivers, introduced minibuses 
and major refurbishment of inherited buses. 
(2) More flexibility in route design and scheduling, new buses. 
Overall change in kilometers: 
(1) Over 30 months, increased by 23%. 
(2) 12% increase. 
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Overall change in passengers: 
( 1) Increased by 20%. 
(2) 8% increase. 
Overall change in fare levels: 
(1) Increased by 5%. 
(2) No increase. 
Change in corporate strategy: 
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( 1) Frequencies revised significantly upwards especially off-peak and week-
ends; minibuses introduced into 70 new residential streets and 80% of 
existing routes changed. 
(2) Compliance procedures in place. 
New opportunities under tendering: 
(1) As a new private entrant able to make all changes above, which were 
impossible under public monopoly. 
(2) Quicker response to problems, clearer defined contract areas previ-
ously disputed with neighboring contractors. 
Actions to reduce environmental impacts: 
( 1) Rebuilt 90 transmissions and 50 engines and introduced minibuses to 
give better fuel economy. 
(2) None. 
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